Discrete equal‐capacity p‐median problem

This paper examines the discrete equal‐capacity p‐median problem that seeks to locate p new facilities (medians) on a network, each having a given uniform capacity, in order to minimize the sum of distribution costs while satisfying the demand on the network. Such problems arise, for example, in local access and transport area telecommunication network design problems where any number of a set of p facility units can be constructed at the specified candidate sites (hence, the net capacity is an integer multiple of a given unit capacity). We develop various valid inequalities, a separation routine for generating cutting planes that are specific members of such inequalities, as well as an enhanced reformulation that constructs a partial convex hull representation that subsumes an entire class of valid inequalities via its linear programming relaxation. We also propose suitable heuristic schemes for this problem, based on sequentially rounding the continuous relaxation solutions obtained for the various equivalent formulations of the problem. Extensive computational results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed valid inequalities, enhanced formulations, and heuristic schemes. The results indicate that the proposed schemes for tightening the underlying relaxations play a significant role in enhancing the performance of both exact and heuristic solution methods for this class of problems. © 2000 John & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 47: 166–183, 2000.     

无标度网络上的队列资源重分配策略

在实际的通信系统中,由于物理条件的限制,每个节点都具有有限长度的队列。研究了在有限队列资源的条件下,队列资源对无标度数据流动力学的影响。提出了一种队列资源重分配策略,策略中节点的队列长度与节点的介数成正比。仿真结果表明,在无标度网络中使用最短路径路由的条件下,所提出的重分配策略可以有效地改进网络的容量。同时对有限队列资源条件下的网络容量进行了理论分析。     

Callable products with dependent demands

Capacity providers such as airlines often sell the same capacity to different market segments at different prices to improve their expected revenues. The absence of a secondary market, due to the nontransferability of airline tickets, gives rise to an opportunity for airlines to broker capacity between consumers with different willingness to pay. One way to broker capacity is by the introduction of callable products. The idea is similar to callable bonds where the issuer has the right, but not the obligation, to buy back the bonds at a certain price by a certain date. The idea of callable products was introduced before under the assumption that the fare-class demands are all independent. The independent assumption becomes untenable when there is significant demand recovery (respectively, demand cannibalization) when lower fares are closed (respectively, opened). In this case, consumer choice behavior should be modeled explicitly to make meaningful decisions. In this paper, we consider a general consumer choice model and develop the optimal strategy for callable products. Our numerical study illustrates how callable products are win-win-win, for the capacity provider and for both high and low fare consumers. Our studies also identify conditions for callable products to result in significant improvements in expected revenues.     

Improvise,adapt and fail to overcome? Capacity building,culture and exogenous change in Sierra Leone

Military capacity building (MCB) is as problematic as it is ubiquitous, with the British experience in Sierra Leone providing a rare example of ostensible success. This article critiques the dominant conceptualisation of MCB as purely a principal–agent (PA) problem, using military change scholarship to examine the impact of wartime British intervention on the Sierra Leonean armed forces. Here, indigenous military change was both externally driven and fundamentally adaptive in nature, allowing MCB to bypass some of the difficulties predicted by PA models. However, this adaptive approach nonetheless failed to reconcile Western military values with prevailing Sierra Leonean culture, complicating post-war stabilisation efforts.     

Conflict and fiscal capacity

We examine the role of war in retarding state fiscal capacity in developing countries, measured by tax revenue ratios to GDP. We build a simple theoretical model of a factionalized state, where patronage substitutes for common interest public goods, along with violent contestation over a rent or prize. Our dynamic panel empirical analysis applied to 79 developing countries, during 1980–2010, indicates that war, especially civil war, retards fiscal capacity, along with imperfect democracy, political repression, poor governance, and dependence on oil and macroeconomic mismanagement. High intensity conflict is particularly destructive of state capacity. In countries experiencing low intensity wars, other institutional factors may matter more than war. The diminution of fiscal capacity due to war appears less pronounced after the end of the cold war.     

Pricing and capacity allocation strategies: Implications for manufacturers with product sharing

Emerging sharing modes, like the consumer-to-consumer (C2C) sharing of Uber and the business-to-consumer (B2C) sharing of GoFun, have considerably affected the retailing markets of traditional manufacturers, who are motivated to consider product sharing when making pricing and capacity decisions, particularly electric car manufacturers with limited capacity. In this paper, we examine the equilibrium pricing for a capacity-constrained manufacturer under various sharing modes and further analyze the impact of capacity constraint on the manufacturer's sharing mode selection as well as equilibrium outcomes. We find that manufacturers with low-cost products prefer B2C sharing while those with high-cost products prefer C2C sharing except when the sharing price is moderate. However, limited capacity motivates manufacturers to enter into the B2C sharing under a relatively low sharing price, and raise the total usage level by sharing high-cost products. We also show that the equilibrium capacity allocated to the sharing market with low-cost products first increases and then decreases. Finally, we find that sharing low-cost products with a high limited capacity leads to a lower retail price under B2C sharing, which creates a win-win situation for both the manufacturer and consumers. However, sharing high-cost products with a low limited capacity creates a win-lose situation for them.     

Why internal conflict deteriorates state capacity? Evidence from Colombian municipalities

Previous work has documented a negative correlation between internal conflict and state capacity. We attempt to shed light on mechanisms that underlie this relationship, using data for Colombian municipalities. We rely on identifying heterogeneous effects of different types of violent events on state capacity, taking advantage of variability across municipalities in the prevalence of specific manifestations of conflict and their intensity. Our findings suggest that events making civilians feel targeted affect the state’s capacity to collect taxes, while those reflecting a stronger military capacity of illegal armies, in particular their large-scale attacks, affect the state’s capacity to provide public goods.     

Evergreening and operational risk under price competition

“Evergreening” is a strategy wherein an innovative pharmaceutical firm introduces an upgrade of its current product when the patent on this product expires. The upgrade is introduced with a new patent and is designed to counter competition from generic manufacturers that seek to imitate the firm's existing product. However, this process is fraught with uncertainty because the upgrade is subject to stringent guidelines and faces approval risk. Thus, an incumbent firm has to make an upfront production capacity investment without clarity on whether the upgrade will reach the market. This uncertainty may also affect the capacity investment of a competing manufacturer who introduces a generic version of the incumbent's existing product but whose market demand depends on the success or failure of the upgrade. We analyze a game where capacity investment occurs before uncertainty resolution and firms compete on prices thereafter. Capacity considerations that arise due to demand uncertainty introduce new factors into the evergreening decision. Equilibrium analysis reveals that the upgrade's estimated approval probability needs to exceed a threshold for the incumbent to invest in evergreening. This threshold for evergreening increases as the intensity of competition in the generic market increases. If evergreening is optimal, the incumbent's capacity investment is either decreasing or nonmonotonic with respect to low end market competition depending on whether the level of product improvement in the upgrade is low or high. If the entrant faces a capacity constraint, then the probability threshold for evergreening is higher than the case where the entrant is not capacity constrained. Finally, by incorporating the risk‐return trade‐off that the incumbent faces in terms of the level of product improvement versus the upgrade success probability, we can characterize policy for a regulator. We show that the introduction of capacity considerations may maximize market coverage and/or social surplus at incremental levels of product improvement in the upgrade. This is contrary to the prevalent view of regulators who seek to curtail evergreening involving incremental product improvement. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 71–89, 2016     

Capacity expansion and cost efficiency improvement in the warehouse problem

The warehouse problem with deterministic production cost, selling prices, and demand was introduced in the 1950s and there is a renewed interest recently due to its applications in energy storage and arbitrage. In this paper, we consider two extensions of the warehouse problem and develop efficient computational algorithms for finding their optimal solutions. First, we consider a model where the firm can invest in capacity expansion projects for the warehouse while simultaneously making production and sales decisions in each period. We show that this problem can be solved with a computational complexity that is linear in the product of the length of the planning horizon and the number of capacity expansion projects. We then consider a problem in which the firm can invest to improve production cost efficiency while simultaneously making production and sales decisions in each period. The resulting optimization problem is non‐convex with integer decision variables. We show that, under some mild conditions on the cost data, the problem can be solved in linear computational time. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 367–373, 2016     

邻频干扰对跳频系统通信容量的影响分析

在已知台站布置的跳频系统中,针对邻频干扰对系统通信容量的影响,从信号信息熵角度,分析了接收点干扰信号和噪声的熵功率,利用信号熵和熵功率不等式,推导得出了以信道参数、干扰台站数和可用频点数为变量的系统通信容量公式。仿真结果表明,在干扰台站数较小时,接收点干扰信号的分布取决于信道参数,而不能简单地假设为高斯分布;并验证了所提理论在nakagami信道下的正确性。